The Atlantic and Its Enemies Read online

  Over a five-year period, $13bn was given to European countries, including Turkey, and that amounted to 2.5 per cent of the entire American economy. In the first year — 1948-9 — over $5bn went, in accordance with the recommendation of a committee set up under Averell Harriman. For a government to collect sums of that sort was remarkable enough but so too was the degree of international co-operation involved. The European Recovery Program (ERP) financed about one third of all exports, and a central office in Paris, the Committee for European Economic Co-operation, collected the statistics of what was needed, and allocated the dollars to pay for them (in April 1948 it became ‘Organization’ and subsequently became the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, today’s OECD). That took time, and a large staff, some of them working in the various countries to check on the statistics and the needs. The Plan operated properly only in 1948-9, when it made a significant contribution to the overall GNP of between 5 and 10 per cent. An Economic Co-operation Administration (ECA) was opened in Washington to supervise the statistics-collecting and co-ordinate it with American spending. There were some grumblers on the Right who did not like this government largesse. Certainly, it amounted to a subsidy for American producers, and the lobbyists got to work — half of the ERP shipments to go in American bottoms, and a quarter of the flour to be sent ready-milled.

  German industry was essential, and the Economic Council in Frankfurt became a proto-government, with six ‘directors’ as technical ministers. By February 1948, when the European Recovery Program got under way, there were 104 deputies and by June 1948 there was a prototypical central bank, with the unwieldy name ‘Bank of German Lands’, the ‘the’ omitted because the ‘lands’ did not include the eastern-zone ones. In May 1947 the Christian Democratic Union emerged as a Bürgerblock dominated by Konrad Adenauer. Quite soon, in July 1948, the ministers-president of the Länder were authorized to set up a constitutional convention, and ‘Bizonia’ had its own people in the Marshall offices in Paris. There were still wrangles with the French, who wanted the Saarland’s coal, and there were still debates about ‘reparations’ in 1949, but these were echoes of old shouting, and in summer 1948 the French Zone was to be added to the other Western ones, as a ‘Trizonia’. An agreement at Washington in April 1949 agreed the bases for a new Germany.

  The Marshall Plan counted as enormously successful. There were some imponderables. For Americans at that time, Europe was a place of endless interest. As a young CIA man of the time, Michael Ledeen, said, its films, wines and women were endlessly fascinating and stood at great contrast to the tea and cookies on offer at home. It was a sort of emancipation. Nan Kempner, wife of a banker stationed in London, was full of admiration for the stoicism of her British friends, giving dinner parties in the midst of severe rationing; she said she found a way of leaving money on the mantelpiece discreetly; Zara Steiner, then studying at Oxford, also found the place exotic, as champagne fountains flowed for summer balls in bread-rationed and then drought-ridden 1947. Fifty thousand people applied for ECA jobs, of which there were 3,701, 2,612 abroad. There was a further imponderable. The myth of Roosevelt grew as time went by. In his lifetime, he had had enemies. But in the later 1940s and 1950s he came to be seen in a golden glow. The New Deal had made for superb propaganda, as public money was poured, with conviction, into the sort of giant engineering projects that distinguished America — especially the Tennessee Valley Authority, designed to irrigate a huge area with dams or river diversion (the original plan was, as it happens, Hoover’s, and has subsequently been much criticized for its effects on the ecology). The New Deal of the 1930s may not have immediately solved America’s problem with unemployment, but the Second World War certainly had, and the American war economy had been one of the world’s wonders. This war economy, thought the people who managed it, just showed what could be done if the government and business co-operated, with government applying controls (as over petrol rationing) when this had to be. A young economist, John Kenneth Galbraith, rose to positions of power and influence. He had trained at Cambridge with J. M. Keynes and had been beguiled by the ease with which Keynes, himself apparently a grandee, took on the grandees of the ‘orthodox’, stuffy financial world, associated with the old and staid virtues. Galbraith, who went on to write very good books and convincing articles about the modern economy, had controlled some prices during the war. He was, instinctively, a believer in the power of government to liberate people from the bad barons or wicked capitalists or stupid bankers who might attempt to rule their lives. Roosevelt had died in April 1945, just before the end of the war in Europe. But his soul went marching on. The Americans who came to Europe in the Marshall Plan period had a wonderful time. Their attitude (‘can do’) came straight from the New Deal and the war. Now it was on display in Europe. Especially in Germany, it went down very well indeed. The Marshall Plan was the application of New Dealing to Europe. The thirties had been a bleak decade for foreign trade, with quotas, exchange controls and highly complex trade agreements between one country and another, striving for balance, and consuming vast amounts of paper in the effort to work out how many exported turnips translated into an imported locomotive. Exports in 1946 stood at only 60 per cent of the figure for 1938 — itself a poor year, given rearmament and the near withdrawal of Germany from the international arena. That was set to change.

  To make the Plan popular, the ECA had a public advisory board on which sat trade unions, Rockefellers, General Motors, the New York ‘Fed’. There were also American businessmen of the classically successful type. Joseph Dodge was a banker, later credited with the restoration of Japan. Paul Hoffman, the administrator of the ECA, was originally a car salesman, had made a million dollars by the time he was thirty-five, and rescued Studebaker. Lucius Clay, Eisenhower’s deputy and then military governor, was an engineer by training and had worked on the Red River Dam and on airfields; at sixty-five, in 1962, he was to become a merchant banker. Averell Harriman, in charge of a committee to popularize the Plan, was a banker, with abrasive manners that irritated the British, who kept trying to prevent him from dominating Paris sessions. His associate David Bruce similarly had a background among what critics called ‘Wall Street wolves’. William Clayton was a Texan oil man, looking everywhere, intelligently, for practical solutions and no-nonsense ways. The operation of the Marshall Plan did involve a great deal of paperwork, with typewriters and carbon copies, as the various government agencies set priorities — food imports, machinery or, more simply, dollars to fend off a crisis with foreign reserves, as was, by and large, the British concern. Foreign trade was generally run by governments, and there was strict exchange control. Cutting through that bureaucracy took energy, and the Americans had it. Already by 1949 a European recovery was going ahead, and the fifties saw a vast rise in prosperity.

  But the Marshall Plan was to work as intended only for two years — 1948-9 and 1949-50, when the bulk of the $13.5bn was spent. The $10bn had more or less sufficed to deal with the European deficit and quite soon the Europeans were exporting again. The further $4bn that had been intended was diverted because the Plan, if not derailed, was greatly changed in emphasis, partly because of its own logic, and partly because of international crises. By the end of 1947, the USSR had turned its satellites into fully Communist countries, without any but a formal vestige of opposition.

  There was a final decisive moment in February 1948, when Czechoslovakia fell under total Communist control, the ‘Czech coup’, as it was known. This was not at all easy, because the vital ingredients were missing: there was no Red Army occupation, and there was a functioning democratic state — and not only that, but one unlike the others in the Soviet bloc. The Czechs had serious heavy industry, and there were world-class firms such as Bat’a for shoes and Škoda for machinery; there was a substantial middle class, and, uniquely in the bloc, a large and organized working class. Czechoslovakia before the war had been roughly on the same level as Belgium, and even the capitals’ archi
tecture had points in common, especially the ingenious twenties additions. In ordinary circumstances, the trade unions and the Social Democrats would no doubt have co-operated with some farmers’ party, whatever its name, to profit from the Marshall Plan and leave Czechoslovakia associated with the West — a sort of Austria or Finland. Such a solution to the Soviet problem was clearly in the mind of the Czech leader in exile, Edvard Beneš. He did not go down the Polish path, to challenge Moscow; instead, he went out of his way to reassure Stalin, and made no trouble when, at the end of the war, the Soviet Union annexed a strip of land on the Carpathians that had a Ukrainian population. He maintained good relations with the Czech Communists who had chosen exile in Moscow, and his ambassador there even turned out to be a Communist agent. A Czech force, again commanded by a man who turned out to be an agent, operated on the Eastern Front — all of this in absolute contrast to the behaviour of the Poles. The counterpoint was of course that the Red Army would not occupy Czechoslovakia, and in due course it did indeed depart. In May 1945 a five-party coalition took over the government, and a year later there was a free election. Prague, undamaged by war, struck a Polish journalist, Stefan Kisielewski, as a miracle: quite unlike grim Warsaw, its shops were full, the lights were working, the hotels were functioning, and even the old aristocracy could be seen making their way through the cobbled medieval streets in black tie, to this or that dinner party in some Schönborn or Lobkowitz Palace. ‘Our Communists are not like the others’ was a line that foreign diplomats or journalists often heard, and some of them were quite impressed by the fluent and knowledgeable minister of culture, Václav Kopecký, who could talk about film and much else. When the British historian A. J. P. Taylor visited Prague, his old London acquaintance, Beneš, showed him the undamaged Prague skyline with pride: ‘all my doing’. He had even sent a ‘plane-load of senior non-Communists to Moscow to negotiate terms with the Communists there, and Stalin, at a farewell banquet, had assured them, “We will never interfere in the internal affairs of our allies.” ’

  But circumstances would prevent Czechoslovakia’s becoming Austria or Finland, let alone Belgium. In 1945 there was indeed a sort of Popular Front regime, as the Communists understood it — an alliance with the Social Democrats and with the ‘progressive’ elements of the middle class (for historical reasons, one element was called ‘National Socialist’, essentially anti-clerical and anti-German). But the two chief political parties had been knocked out because of their behaviour during the war. Hitler had taken over the rump of the Czech lands, as a ‘Protectorate’, and there had been a collaborationist government run by the old Agrarian Party, the chief Czech party before the war. Collaboration had gone so far that the Czech lands, along with Belgium, were the only parts of Nazi-occupied Europe in which industrial production had gone up, not down. Its chiefs were put on trial and the party was banned. Slovakia had been even more heavily involved in collaboration. She had been given independence, and a nationalist or even Fascist regime had followed in 1939, under a priest, Mgr Jozef Tiso. With the blessing of the Yalta conferees, only ‘anti-Fascist’ parties were now allowed into parliaments, such that the two largest elements in Czech and Slovak politics were banned. Slovakia might, as today, otherwise have remained independent, and it was really only Soviet support for the integrity of Czechoslovakia that kept the country together.

  On the face of things, restored Czechoslovakia was a functioning democracy, complete with cabinet and parliament and debates. However, the real centre of power lay in the ‘National Front’, a body on which were represented, by appointment, the five permitted political parties, and the administration consisted of ‘national committees’, again not elected. Not only this: the party members in the supposed parliament were under orders to vote as they were told by the National Front. In its regional and local committees, there was not much opposition to the Communists and they had a vast prize to offer. With Stalin’s support, the 3 million German inhabitants of the country were expelled in 1945-6, with a suitcase each. In German-inhabited towns (in Slovakia, to a limited extent, the same happened with Hungarians), placards went up, couched in the same insulting language that had been used by the Nazis as regards the Jews: ‘All Germans, regardless of age or sex’, were to collect in the town square and be marched off or in some cases moved by train, and dumped in shattered Germany. Unknown numbers died, and their property was free for the taking. However, since the Communists controlled the relevant administration, anyone aspiring to take over these lands and houses, including many gypsies, would have to register with the Communist Party (as happened in Poland). The non-Communist elements in the National Front did not object to this — quite the contrary, they were even more vociferous about the process than the Communists themselves, and one of the chief ‘National Socialists’ (or ‘Radicals’, a more suitable translation), Peter Zenkl, argued for the abolition of ‘capitalism’, by which he meant foreign-owned plants and farms. A land reform took over 5m hectares, one fifth of them forest, and three fifths of industrial output was taken over by the State, again with the blessing of the non-Communists. Even the Communists argued for a slower speed of change and put themselves forward as protectors of ‘the small man’. Meanwhile, on any national issue, including irritating little territorial claims against Poland, the five parties were glued together. This mattered very greatly in anything to do with Slovakia. Where the Czech lands were prosperous and modern, Slovakia was in many ways backward: still heavily peasant and Catholic, the educated element often Hungarian and Jewish or, where Slovak, part of the small Lutheran minority. When Slovakia had declared independence in March 1939, it had been a vast blow to the Czechs, hitherto the dominant people, and there was still much resentment at the Slovaks’ behaviour during the war, when they had been pampered favourites of the Third Reich. Since it was Stalin and the Communists who in effect kept the country together, they received Czech support.

  This made for the other unique (or, given Chile much later on, almost unique) feature in the case of Czechoslovakia: the Communists were by a long head the strongest party. As part of his deal with Stalin, Beneš had already allowed them a great deal of weight in the National Front, where they took a leading role in Security, the Interior, and (though their man was theoretically non-Party) Defence. They used their weight quite cleverly to make sure of the police and the security services, the StB; they wormed their way into the trade unions; they set up ‘organizations’ for resistance fighters and the like which (as in France) they could parade as democratic and anti-Fascist bodies. In particular, they set up militias based on factories which, if there ever were a clash, could easily dominate the streets, given that neither police nor army would intervene. A free election in May 1946 revealed their strength. In the Czech lands they took 40.17 per cent of the votes, three other Czech parties taking 15-24 per cent each; of these, the Social Democrats contained an element that could easily take the Communists’ part and therefore even give them a slight Czech majority. In Slovakia the proportions were very different. There, a Slovak Democratic Party gained three fifths of the vote, the Communists under a third, which gave them, all in all, 38 per cent of the seats — still the largest party by far, but potentially a minority just the same.

  In 1946, as tensions rose in Germany, Czechoslovakia still appeared to be an island of peace and even prosperity. Exports went ahead; Western visitors came and went; Czechs put themselves in the world’s newspapers with this or that far-flung expedition. There were political wrangles as the parties fought over one proposal or another, and the non-Communists managed to win one such, a proposal for a wealth tax that would have damaged small enterprise. But Czechoslovakia, her borders reaching far into the bloc, and even, for a few miles, contiguous with the Soviet Union’s, was no Finland, and there came a moment of truth in the early summer of 1947. George C. Marshall proposed his Plan, and the British joined him in inviting all European governments to attend a conference at Paris. The invitations went to the Soviet bloc, and th
e Russians did indeed appear in great numbers. The Czechs, and even the chief Polish economist, were anxious to go along with Marshall. But Stalin denounced the Plan, as a plot by which imperialists could take over weak economies such as those of central Europe and the Balkans; the bloc states, including Finland, refused to accept Marshall’s terms, and a Czechoslovak delegation in Moscow was also instructed along these lines. Czechoslovakia therefore missed out on the developments that were to turn neighbouring West Germany, in a short space of time, back into a great trading industrial power.

  As that development went ahead, Stalin could see that a rearmed West Germany, part of an imperialist bloc, would be on his doorstep, and an order went out for the Communist parties everywhere to respond. In August, at Szklarska Poręba in Silesia, a one-time German spa called Schreiberhau, in a manor house that had been turned into a secret-police sanatorium, a meeting of the main Communist parties was held, and was harangued by Andrey Zhdanov, the cultural commissar. There would be an end to ‘Popular Front’ tactics, i.e. alliances with treacherous middle-class or peasant politicians; trouble should be made, through strikes or whatever in western Europe, especially France and Italy; a union should be forced through of Social Democrats and Communists, and a one-party regime imposed, with all the paraphernalia of relentless propaganda and faked elections. This programme had already gone through in the Balkans and East Germany; Poland was nearly there; Hungary was about to undergo it, with the September elections. Czechoslovakia stood out but the secretary-general of the Czech Communist Party, Rudolf Slansky, soon had a plan ready. There were two possible routes to takeover. Power might simply, Bolshevik-fashion, be seized. But that would be too obvious, and would shock western European opinion. Better ‘Trojan Horse’ tactics, infiltrating the enemy parties. That programme now went ahead.